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probably see no advantage in direct involvement in the decisions of a
government which they did not control. They might however press
for membership by some of their sympathisers and try to obtain
for a Chinese representative rights of consultation which could in
practice amount to a veto on certain action by the Hong Kong
Government, including appointments to the Executive and Legislative
Councils.
22. Any concessions on HMG's part in this direction would create
very serious difficulties. Legally these would not be insuperable.
But
There could, it is true, be problems if the Chinese claimed rights
of representation on behalf of Hong Kong Chinese who were Citizens
of the United Kingdom and Colonies (to become Citizens of the
British Dependent Territories under proposed legislation).
arrangements could theoretically be made for a Chinese representative
to play a part in the administration. However, Chinese government
participation would be regarded with great suspicion by the Hong Kong
population and by investors. It would be seen by many as the prelude
to a sell-out. It would be very difficult to allay such fears by
a general understanding which simply emphasised Peking's support for
stability in the Territory. Probably only a new written agreement or
an official statement by the Chinese Government that a separate
administration under Britain would continue would be sufficient.
a formal undertaking is most unlikely.
23. Even if the confidence problem could be overcome, the position
of the Hong Kong Government and that of the Secretary of State
vis a vis Parliament would be made almost untenable by any move
which allowed the Peking Government a real say on policy in the
Territory.
Such
which
In practice the Governor ensures that any changes
might be open to misinterpretation are explained to Peking, usually
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