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Government would take a similar view and would not favour the idea of
a representative of the Guangdong Provincial Government.
However,
even the straight formalisation of Chinese Government representation
in Hong Kong would be regarded as of considerable significance
by public opinion in the Territory. Taken on its own, it could be
seen as a move towards an agreement with China. Damage to confidence
would depend on the context in which the move was set, whether
significant concessions had been made by the Chinese in return and
what the Chinese said about it. In any event it would be essential
to agree a definition of the representative's functions, and avoid
the position of having 'two Governors' (see record of Sir Alec
Douglas-Home's meeting with Zhou Enlai in 1972). If the matter came
up during the next 5 years, this would probably mean in practice
moves on our part to reassure investors and in particular to overcome
the difficulty over individual land leases. We would need to use
a concession over a Chinese representative to obtain as concrete
undertakings as possible from the Chinese on these points. These
should go beyond the general assurances which Chinese leaders have
given so far. We would need at least an arrangement whereby
Peking agreed that the Hong Kong Government would in future issue
standard leases of a definite duration, say 25 years, and that Peking
recognised their validity. In this case we would still need to
overcome the problem of whether such leases were valid under British
law (which in practice would require amendment of the 1898 Order in
Council).
Chinese Participation in Hong Kong Administration
21. The range of possible demands is given in paragraph 12(c) above.
The more extreme proposals, such as membership of the Executive
and/or Legislative Councils, are very unlikely to be made by the
Chinese, who would themselves not wish to upset confidence, and would
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