GR 500
SECRET
DEDIP
FM PEKING 170847Z FEB 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 17/2
SECRET
INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR)
DED IP
FOR YOUDE
TOP COPY
АКК онов
cuoli
Idd (HKG)
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY MO. 51
18 FEB 1981.
DEAK OFFICER
INDEX
اله
PA
£ (7)
REGISTRY Action Taken
35
(20A-C)
HONG KONG TELEGRAMS NOS 114 116: FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1. I DO NOT WANT TO PROLONG THIS EXCHANGE, BUT I SHOULD NOTE
BRIEFLY SOME OF THE POINTS IN THESE TELEGRAMS ON WHICH I HAVE
RESERVATIONS.
see 37
36
2. FIRST, WE SHOULD BE CLEAR ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
STRATEGY PROPOSED IN PARAS 5 8 OF HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 115.
IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE SO READILY CONCEDES, EVEN WITH THE SUGGESTED CAVEAT, THAT THERE IS STILL TIME" WE RUN THE RISK OF CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY WHICH CONTINUED
DEGREE 1 TACTICS MAY DO LITTLE TO ERODE. WE THEREBY LESSEN
THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CHINESE LEADERS WILL OF THEMSELVES DECIDE TO ACT (PARA 4(B) OF HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 115) AND
INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY WILL ONLY BE PRECIPITATED INTO ACTION BY THE IMMINENCE OF COLLAPSE IN HONG KONG (PARA 4(A) OF TUR). IF I UNDERSTAND THE TUR CORRECTLY, IT ENVISAGES (PARA 10) THAT IF NO SUGGESTION OF TALKS IS MADE TO DENG IN
APRIL WE ON OUR SIDE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL CONFIDENCE BEGINS TO
SLIDE BEFORE MAKING ANY MOVE. WE COULD THEN FIND OURSELVES
SEEKING TALKS AND TRYING TO NEGOTIATE IN GREAT HASTE UNDER
POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE MORE ACUTE
FOR OURSELVES THAN FOR THE CHINESE. EVEN IF WE HAD UP OUR
SLEEVES PROPOSALS PREPARED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS, THESE WOULD
HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED IN VACUO. WHETHER ON LEASES OR ON THE
FUTURE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OUR ASSESSMENTS OF CHINESE
DESIDERATA AND LIKELY CHINESE REACTIONS WOULD BE LITTLE MORE
THAN GUESS-WORK. WE COULD ALSO HAVE THE TASK OF EXPLAINING
TO PUBLIC CRITICS WHY WE HAD NOT SOUGHT TALKS BEFORE THE
CRISIS HIT US.
SECRET
NOTED AW
2012
Все 2 сосеви $19.2