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2.
(b)
(c)
In other words we appear to be hooked on British law rather than medium-term Chinese intentions.
Para 3. It needs to be made clearer that independence for Hong Kong is ruled out and that, by extension, any move that might be seen as pointing in that direction must be treated with the greatest care.
Para 5. Chinese assurances are that they do not wish to harm the interests of investors rather than the status quo as such. They have also implied (eg Deng to me in April 1979) that they anticipate Hong Kong remaining capitalist for a considerable time to come. It is the political format for this about which they have been most vague; they have said there might well be change (Deng 1979 again) but not what or when.
Medium Term
5.
the paper.
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(a)
(b)
The following comments deal with paragraphs 7-19 of
General:
The introductory present paragraphs 6 and 7 set the guidelines for what follows. I attach a redraft.
Points of detail:
(i)
(ii)
Para 9. The legal background on sovereignty and the implications of a concession by us could be covered in an appendix (see para 2(b) above). The points which need to be made here
are:-
(a)
(b)
that a concession by us on sovereignty would be such a major move that it could only be taken as part of a general agreement on the long-term futur;
the effect such a statement would have, if any, on the juridical basis of the administration of the colony.
Para 11. Action to extend the Governor's powers to administer the New Territories after 1997 could surely be unilateral in a legislative sense (eg Order in Council) without leaving doubt about its legal basis. But it could not be undertaken without Chinese agreement, since an adverse reaction by China would immediately undo all the political benefit to confidence.
(iii) Para 12. This would not help unless the Chinese
agreed to an arrangement for amendment to the 1898 Order in Council along the lines of that referred to in the paragraph above.
See also drafting amendments attached
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/contd.
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