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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG:
ESSENTIAL FACTS
DSR 11C
1. Chinese have often, particularly during the 1970s, raised
issue of official representation in Hong Kong.
Our response
The
has been that time was not ripe for such a change. Governor, on his visit to Peking in March 1979, said that in his opinion time would come for such representation but, if now, could affect confidence. Huang Hua said it would probably be raised again when the Secretary of State visited Peking shortly thereafter (the visit did not in the end take
place).
2.
Establishment of a representative office would have considerable impact on Hong Kong and could be misinterpreted and lead to a run on confidence. This would depend on type
ef further assurances for investors and on the agreed defi-
nition of functions. The assurances would need to be accom- panied by concrete measures to maintain confidence rather thar simple generalisations such as Deng Xiaoping telling the The Chinese have
investors to put their hearts at ease.
never defined the precise status and functions of an official representative, though they have stated no executive
functions would be sought.
3. The First Director of the New China News Agency (NCNA) Office in Hong Kong has, over the last 7 or 8 years, been
the unofficial channel of communication between the
Governments in Hong Kong and Peking. Through the standing, access, privileges and public recognition he receives, he has These become China's special representative in all but name. arrangements work well. We should not contemplate change except in return for bankable assurances on investment and land leases (see Brief No. ...).
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