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HOFO #26/38
GR 700
CONFIDENTIAL
TELELETTER
FROM D.C. WILSON, HONG KONG
DATE 30 SEPTEMBER 1981
8.
HKK 020
10. 51 30 SEP 1981
FOLLOWING FOR R.J.T. MCLAREN ESQ, FED, F C O
COPY TO
R.D. CLIFT ESQ, HK AND GD. F CO
M.W. ATKINSON ESQ, MBE, PEKING
MILITARY LIAISON WITH GUANGDONG
Jason Takon
die Pto
Mr. McQuat 30/9 Mr William
Inki
IT WAS RATHER ALARMING TO LEARN FROM YOUR LETTER OF 7 SEPTEMBER THAT THE CDS PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN OUR CEF AND THE PLA COMMANDER IN GUANGDONG WITHOUT CONSULTING ANY OF US BEFOREHAND OR INDEED INFORMING US AFTERWARDS. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSAL HAS NOW BEEN MADE. THE CHINESE, AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, HAVE RESPONDED POSITIVELY, WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT.
2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE GOVERNOR. THE LATTER HAS NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK THIS OVER WITH CBF WHO, AS I SAID IN MY INTERIM REPLY TELELETTERS, HAS BEEN AWAY, AND IS JUST ABOUT TO GO AWAY AGAIN. BUT THE GOVERNOR HAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD
SEND THE FOLLOWING VIEWS WHICH ARE, OF NECESSITY, TENTATIVE AND PUT
FORWARD IN IGNORANCE OF WHAT EXACTLY THE MOD AIM TO ACHIEVE BY LIAISON WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE GUANGDONG MILITARY REGION.
3. WE HERE ARE NOT KEEN ON THE IDEA. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REASONS:
(1) WE ALREADY HAVE GOOD LIAISON ON THE PA/NCNA NET, ALTHOUGH COMMUNICATION BETWEEN NCNA AND GUANGDONG AND VICE VERSA IS OFTEN SLOWER THAN WE WOULD WISH. WE HAVE A FLEDGLING SYSTEM OF SECURITY LIAISON AT THE BORDER INVOLVING SECURITY BRANCH, THE POLICE, THE PA'S OFFICE AND WHATEVER OTHER BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ARE NECESSARY, ALTHOUGH NOT SO FAR THE MILITARY. WE ALREADY HAVE TO WORK HARD TO ENSURE THAT WIRES DO NOT GET CROSSED. YET ANOTHER CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WOULD RISK ADDING CONFUSION.
(11) PERSONALITIES. AS YOU SAY, JOHN CHAPPLE WOULD DOUBTLESS HANDLE ANY CONTACTS WITH SKILL AND POLITICAL COMMONSENSE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE, HOWEVER, THAT FUTURE CBFS WILL HAVE THE SAME POLITICAL WISDOM. SOME HAVE NOT BEEN NOTABLE FOR IT. FRANKLY, THE WAY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE HANDLED THIS SO FAR DOES NOT INCREASE ONE'S CONFIDENCE.
(111) WHAT DO WE GAIN? UNDERSTANDABLY, THE MILITARY HERE WOULD
LIKE A CLOSE TACTICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBERS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER. THEY ARGUE THAT BOTH ARE DOING THE SAME JOB OF DEALING WITH ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ETC. AND THAT BOTH SIDES COULD DO THIS MORE EFFICIENTLY IF THEY HAD CLOSER LIAISON ON TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT. ALL THIS IS TRUE, BUT IT
DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHINESE SECRETIVENESS, PARTICULARLY ON MILITARY MATTERS. PERSONALLY I SEE NO PROSPECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF DEVELOPING THE SORT OF TACTICAL LIAISON WHICH WOULD HELP OUR SECURITY FORCES TO DEPLOY MORE EFFECTIVELY. INDEED, I SEE RISKS THAT ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH TACTICAL LIAISON, BADLY HANDLED OR MISUNDERSTOOD, WOULD CREATE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.
(IV) A VISIT BY THE CBF TO GUANGZHOU WOULD INEVITABLY BE WIDELY PUBLICISED HERE. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTED AS PART OF THE INCREASINGLY CLOSER RELATIONSHIP ALTHOUGH, EQUALLY PROBABLY, THERE WOULD BE SOME RUMOUR-MONGERING HINTING AT MORE SINISTER INTENTIONS. A VISIT IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WOULD BE THE NATURAL SUCCESSOR. IT IS HARDER TO JUDGE HOW THIS WOULD BE RECEIVED LOCALLY. I SUSPECT THAT IT WOULD CAUSE MORE CONCERN THAN A VISIT BY OUR SIDE TO GUANGDONG.
4. ALL THIS, WE BELIEVE, ADDS UP TO A CASE AGAINST TRYING TO ESTABLISH DIRECT HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY LIAISON WITH GUANGDONG UNLESS AND UNTIL A CONVINCING CASE FOR IT IS MADE IN DETAIL. SO FAR CBF HAS NOT EVEN MENTIONED THE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNOR. IN THEORY WE WOULD HAVE SEEN LESS OBJECTION TO THE CBF VISITING CHINA, INCLUDING GUANGZHOU, AS PART OF A LARGER GROUP, E.G. A VISIT
TO CHINA BY THE CDS AS IS APPARENTLY PLANNED FOR NEXT YEAR. BUT, NOW THE IDEA OF PERSONAL CONTACT BETWEEN CBF AND THE GUANGDONG MILITARY COMMANDER HAS BEEN FLOATED BY US, THE INCLUSION OF THE CBF IN THE CDS'S PARTY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO A DIRECT INVITATION FROM THE CHINESE FOR THE CBF TO MAKE A PERSONAL VISIT. IT IS PROBABLY BETTER THEREFORE TO LET THE WHOLE IDEA DROP FOR THE MOMENT AND TO BRUSH ASIDE SUGGESTIONS OF VISITS IF THE CHINESE REVERT TO IT.
5. THE GOVERNOR WILL BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE CBF WHEN THE LATTER RETURNS TOWARDS THE END OF OCTOBER. YOU WILL BY THEN HAVE TAKEN OVER FROM ME HERE AND WILL PROBABLY WISH TO ADD SOME
COMMENTS THEN,
SIGNED D.C. WILSON (P.A.)
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