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Islanders might decide they want nothing to do with further talks with the Argentines (in which case, even if UK/Argentine talks were held, they would be an empty exercise). Alternatively, the Islands might decide to explore further what a settlement would mean in practice, only to be met by Argentine inflexibility and intransigence. Either way, the road to a negotiated solution could be blocked.
5. We have no idea how far the new Argentine administration might be prepared to go in such circumstances to achieve its ends on the Falklands. But we cannot rule out the possibility that they might ultimately resort to military action. I stress that we see no immediate danger of this. But if it seemed to the Argentines that there was nothing to be gained by further negotiation, pressure from press and public on the Government could become SO great that it was impossible to resist. Alternatively, the Argentine Government might be looking for a foreign policy success to distract attention from the domestic situation or from a foreign policy failure, (eg in the dispute over the Beagle Channel with Chile). Thus the ultimate use of force by Argentina is a contingency that cannot be ruled out.
6.
With this in mind, we read with interest Mrs Pantling's Letter of 24 March to Roberts about contingency planning for the Falklands, and its enclosure. But I fear that the enclosure makes only too clear how out of date our contingency plans are. For example, it refers to the possible deployment of HMS Ark Royal'. We think it would be a very useful exercise to update these plans and, once they are agreed by all concerned, to keep them current.
7. The sort of information it seems to me we need, falls into two principal categories:
(i) How could the Falklands population be evacuated?
(ii) What could be done to counter any
counter any military action?
On (i) the main questions are probably whether evacuation would be by sea or by air; where the ships (or 'planes) would come from; how long it would take them to arrive and complete the evacuation; how long it would take to round up such a scattered population. On (ii) questions which occur to us are what sort of naval forces could be made available; what sort of notice would be required in order to act as a deterrent to Argentine action (or, in the worst case, to undo an Argentine invasion); where would troops come from;
how would they get
to the Islands; how long would it take?
8.
I am sure that there are other questions which you will be able to think of. We do of course have a
copy of the instructions to the Royal Marine detachment in the event of an emergency, but as the 1977 paper makes clear, their role would
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