17
To say that the
2
Governor is the authority for their
interpretation can be said to mean, in theory, that the Governor can construe a Regulation in any way which he thinks fit, though in practice he would be unlikely to do this in a wholly unreasonable
way.
Such a provision may weaken the reliance which a public officer can place on G.Rs, but does not strike at their nature. The reference to having "no force in law" appears to be no more than an indication, to persons unfamiliar with the niceties of legislation, in its many disguises, that these regulations are
not legislative in effect.
We conclude that there is an intention on both sides
to enter a binding contract. The public officer does so without
reservation. The Crown also intends to enter a contract by
which the officer shall be bound but not itself, though the
appointee is not warned of the lop-sided nature of the contract,
as seen by the Crown. There is no hint that he must keep his promises, but that the Crown need not.
We decide that there is a contract between the CroWN
and its servants and that its terms should be, and are, mutually
enforceable, even though this contract contains one anomalous provision (the power of dismissal at pleasure) which overrides the contract and, if used, effectively negates the usual
relationship of employer and employee. Col. Regs. do not form
part of that contract.
An important difficulty remains. What terms and
conditions form part of the contract?
As indicated above, an appointee receives a letter of
offer to which is attached a memorandum of conditions of service,
This memorandum will contain a clause, which informs the officer
that he is subject to G.Rs, Departmental Instructions and Col.
Regs.
There is no difficulty in finding that the contents
of the letter of appointment and the memorandum form part of
the contract. But do all the G.Rs and other instruments to
A. A