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for dismissal of the servant, or even by express terms which
purport to exclude the power.
The dismissal at pleasure rule has prevented a public
officer from-suing in contract for wrongful dismissal..
It has,
however, become well-established that he can recover, on a quantum meruit, pay-which was due to him before his dismissal became effective - see Kodeeswaran v. Attorney-General of Ceylon
(9)
that F
In that appeal, the Privy Council quoted with approval
(10) the observation of Lord Atkin in Reilly v. R.
a power
to determine a contract at will is not inconsistent with the
existence of a contract until so determined." By implication,
this decision has overruled Kennedy-Skipton v. Attorney General
(11) Of Hong Kong
in so far as that case may have decided that a
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public officer-could not recover arrears of salary.
Kodeeswaran thus indicates that the Privy Council accepts
the existence of a contractual relationship between the Crown and
its servants. But what kind of relationship is it?
i
3
We do
The terms of appointment of the appellants vary.
not know why, and have assumed that the differences mean no more than that the standard forms of engagement have been revised from
time to time.
Version A is entitled Memorandum of Conditions of Service
for Officers on Temporary Terms, paragraph 2(4) of the Memorandum
reads
"The officer is subject to the Orders and
Regulations of the Government end to Departmental Instructions for the time being in force; to any speciel Ordinances or Regulations (whether administrative or statutory) which apply to the office or to the department in which he is appointed; and to Colonial Regulations. These
(9) (1970) A.D. 1111.
(10) (1934) A.C. 176, 130 (H.L.), (11) (1951) H.K.L.R. 234.
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