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to deal with the point.
For myself I stil find it difficult
to view as part of a true contract provisions which can be
completely changed at will by one party alone. But apart from
that aspect no provisions can carry binding legal effect unless
both parties thereto intend that they shall. That intention
must be looked for in the documents that have been used.
Regulation 2 says this:
"Government Regulations are Regulations made
by the Governor and authority for their interpretation and application is vested in him ... They have no force in law, except in so far as they set out the provisions of an Ordinance or ct of Parliament."
In my view that language leaves no room for doubt. I am not
prepared to read the words "they have no force in law" as
meaning merely that they have no statutory for co. The
reservation to the Governor of the true interpretation of
their meaning, which in true contracts is a mattor for the
courts, is another indication of non contractual intent. That
view is reinforced by the language of some of the Memoranda of
Conditions of Service which have been shown to ac. Most
provide that:
"Those regulations do not constitute a
contract between the Crown and its servants".
In my view the regulations referred to include the Civil
Service Regulations. I have no hesitation in concluding that
by the use of such words in the Regulations and Memoranda the
Crown has evinced an intention not to be bound by those
regulations in the sense that they could be enforced against
the Crown in a court of law.
I should perhaps add in passing that success in this
particular argument would have availed the plaintiff's nothing. They would have been left to face an effective Regulation 611.
There are two further matters that I should touch
upon. The first is the question of natural justice. It is
said that .rticle XVI confers a disciplinary power with which
I agree, the final words make this clear and that in the
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