OF MACHINE BUILDING VISITED SHENZHEN IN AUGUST AND TOLD SOME HONG KONG BUSINESSMEN CONCERNED WITH AVIATION THAT THE MINISTRY HAD BEEN GIVEN THE TASK OF ESTABLISHING AN AIRPORT AND AN AVIATION INDUSTRY (INCLUDING MANUFACTURE, REPAIR AND SERVICING) IN SHENZHEN.

11. THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD FOR SITING THE AIRPORT IN CHINA NEAR TO THE BORDER WITH HONG KONG ARE:

(A) IT WOULD COST LESS.

(COMMENT: THERE IS NO SOUND BASIS FOR THIS CONCLUSION BUT IT COULD WELL BE TRUE):

(B) A COOPERATIVE PROJECT OF SUCH A SIZE (WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE CHINA HAVING A LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT CONTRACT WITH THE HKG

OR WITH A HONG KONG CONSORTIUM AND POSSIBLY A LEASE EXTENDING BEYOND 1997) WOULD BE A MAJOR BOOST TO CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG'S FUTURE.

ITS ADVOCATES LAY PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE SECOND ARGUMENT AND FAVOUR AN APPROACH TO CHINA NOW AS POLITICALLY THE MOST APPROPRIATE

TIME.

12. THE MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST, WHICH HAVE THE SUPPORT OF A LARGE MAJORITY OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS, ARE:

(A) HONG KONG'S MAIN MEANS OF ACCESS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD WOULD

BE BEYOND ITS OWN FRONTIERS. IN CONSEQUENCE, HONG KONG WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO PRESSURES FROM CHINA AS TO ITS USE. THESE COULD VARY FROM PREVENTING THE USE OF THE AIRPORT BY CERTAIN AIRLINES (E. G. CHINA AIRLINES, SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS) TO PREVENTING THE MOVEMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES IF THERE WERE CIVIL DISTURBANCES. TO REDUCE THIS VULNERABILITY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO RETAIN KAI TAK AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THUS LOSING THE BENEFITS TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE SUBSTANTIAL REVENUE THAT WOULD BE ACHIEVED IF KAI TAK WERE CLOSED AND MUCH OF THE LAND SOLD FOR DEVELOPMENT. SUCH SALES IN THE RIGHT POLITICAL CLIMATE COULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS FINANCING THE NEW AIRPORT.

(C) IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO COORDINATE THE OPERATION

CF TWO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS SO CLOSE TO EACH OTHER. EVEN USE OF KAI TAK IS DIFFICULT WITHOUT INFRINGING CHINESE AIR- SPACE, AND CHINA COULD MAKE ITS CONTINUED USE IMPOSSIBLE AT ANY TIME. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RESIST THE SITING OF A NEW AIRPORT IN CHINA IF THE CPG INSISTED ON IT. SO THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO HEAD OFF THIS IDEA IF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT ARE AS STRONG AS WE THINK.

(C) UNDER THE CHICAGO CONVENTION AIR TRAFFIC RIGHTS ESSENTIALLY DERIVE FROM SOVEREIGN TERRITORIAL RIGHTS, AN AIRPORT IN CHINA WOULD INVOLVE TRANSFERRING TRAFFIC RIGHTS FROM HMG (AND THUS HONG KONG) TO CHINA AND THE END OF THE HONG KONG-UK CABOTAGE ROUTE. THE ONLY WAY THIS COULD BE AVOIDED WOULD BE BY AN ARRANGEMENT GIVING HMG SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SITE OF THE AIRPORT. IT IS INCONVEIVABLE THAT CHINA WOULD BE

WILLING TO CONCEDE SOVEREIGNTY IN THIS WAY:

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

|(D)

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