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27
(c)
(d)
By placing strict liability on the operating company, with the PRC, Hong Kong and UK Governments standing behind it, it might be possible to exempt British suppliers from their normal liability for damages arising from fault of design, equipment or operation. However this
exemption should not extend to non- British suppliers unless their governments were similarly prepared to accept some residual third party liability. Otherwise they should be liable in the normal way. In practice this should mean that those primarily liable to pay compensation should have a right of recourse against the non-British suppliers when fault on their part could be proved;
The liability would exist only, as long as Hong Kong and the new Territories remained the
[and
responsibility of the UK [and outside the
control of the PRC./
If liability is to be shared, the way this is to be achieved will need to be expressed in some form of agreement between the UK and the PRC. In theory this might be achieved by inducing the PRC to accede to the relevant convention, and modifying their application as between the PRC and Hong Kong by bilateral agreement. But this is somewhat cumbersome. Moreover the PRC may not wish to accede and existing members may not wish to accept their accession. It would appear to be simpler to incorporate the main elements of, the conventions,
modified as described above, into a self-contained bilateral agreement. Such an agreement would be likely to be necessary even if neither HMG nor the Hong Kong Government accepted any liability, to establish Hong Kong rights to compensation from the PRC.
Commercial Relationships
28.
The UK's objective is to maximise UK hardware sales. It will however be necessary to obtain the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and probably the whole nuclear island from abroad.
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