CONFIDENTIAL
GUANGDONG NUCLEAR POWER STATION PROJECT
Objective
The purpose of this paper is to set out some of the considerations to which GEC will wish to have regard in discussions with Framatone and Westinghouse on this project.
UK Government's Position
Ministers have only given their general support to the project, to the release of UKAEA and other resources and the partial payment of the UKs support to the feasibility study on the basis that major benefits including commercial orders will accrue to the UK. The wider British commercial interest encompasses:
de facto project leadership;
the supply of the conventional island;
the supply of parts of the nuclear island other than the NS3;
The supply of fuel together with its reprocessing.
The UK's opening stance is therefore to present its position on all four issues as-understood and to seek competitive offers from the potential nuclear suppliers. Whether Framatone, Westinghouse (or indeed KWU) are chosen by the UK depends on the attractiveness of the respective offers made and how far they accord with the four principles set out above.
Non-proliferation
The position of the UK Government is that non-proliferation conditions will be primarily a matter for the Governments of the nuclear reactor and nuclear fuels suppliers. HMG would wish to take part in any discussions and would aim to play the major role as regards nuclear fuel supply, but would not expect to require full IAEA safeguards since PRC is a nuclear weapon state. Framatone and Westing- house and their respective Governments will need to consider how far they can comply with the UK stance.
The position of the French is believed to be similar to that of the UK but that of America is different in that the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act lays down certain requirements in respect of exports of nuclear equipment and materials. The precise interpretation of the Act in relation to exports to the FRC is not clear to us but it seems likely that for direct exports from the USA, the US authorities would seek some form of safeguards although they may not have to insist on IAEA interpretation. The position of the US authorities on the export of equipment made under US licence abroad is likely to be less controversial.
Safety Standards.
Although it will be for the PRC to establish its own safety standards and regula- tory body, the Chinese are well aware that the safety of a nuclear station is of