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/not
A
facilities, and it appears that the most we could expect
would be an assurance that no materials or equipment would
be diverted to military use, which the Chinese were
previously prepared to give the French. Since China is
already a nuclear weapon state the provisions of the NPT do
not apply and there would be no valid case for criticism of
a sale without safeguards inspection. We have decided not
to raise non-proliferation questions with the Chinese at this
stage but will draw on the following points if they raise
the subject with us:
(i)
(ii)
*
We would expect to require more vigorous non-
proliferation conditions than our competitors;
There are no nuclear proliferation issues which
would affect the continuation of discussions between
KEC and CLP;
(iii) In any case if the Nuclear Core is supplied from
outside the UK the question of non-proliferation
assurances will be primarily for the supplier
4.
country (although we would expect to be involved in
discussions).
We believe that the best way to advance UK interests is
to provide UKAEA support for the feasibility study in order
to influence the final decision of the study in the UK's
favour. The UKAEA representatives on the study must there-
fore take great care to present themselves as impartial.
5. Mr Parry has previously asked ten Parliamentary Questions
on this subject. They were answered together in a written
answer from Mr Blaker on 2 June.
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