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CONFIDENTI....
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The Longer Term
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There is no requirement under the Non-lroliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to accept safeguards on their civil nuclear facilities; nor any obligation on a supplier country to insist on au NWS accepting safeguards, although for a number of reasons we should not ask for less in the way of assurand
than have the French. The acquisition of a PWR is however unlikely to add to China's already extensive weapons capability.
9 On the other hand there are wider foreign policy consideratior and in particular the possible effect on India of any sale of an un-safeguarded nuclear reactor to China. The security concerns of China, India and Pakistan interlock. India remains deeply suspicious of China's military intentions and is not reconciled to
China's status as a NWS. A hostile reaction can therefore be
expected from India to the sale of an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor to China whatever the logic of the case. This would be likely to
make even more difficult the task of winning Indian acceptance of international non-proliferation arrangements including safeguards on all her own programmes. But, since the French have already agreed to supply nuclear equipment to China on the basis described above, for us to insist on stiffer terms would merely jeopardise the prime commercial objective without reducing the risk that India will cite Western nuclear sales to China to justify an unhelpful attitude on her part.
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Criticism can also be expected from the USSR. In normal
circumstances they would be unlikely to press very hard but in the present situation they can be expected to take every opportunity of seeking to gain advantage with the Indians and extending their influence in the sub-Continent.
11 It should also be a UK objective to seek to draw the Chinese
into wider international discussion of nuclear trade and non-
proliferation in particular by encouraging China to join the IAEA. The Guangdong nuclear project perhaps provides us with an opportunity to do this.
CONFIDENTIAL