Aur Ghas Ir seat !
NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION
Dec. 2 1980
ISSA
HKIC suol!
22.1
The relationship between Hongkong
by
Dase
71 Balfour Spa London
INDEX
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO, 51
Project
Walter Easey:Secretary Hongkong RFFEBI Tel. 708 5275
DESK OFFICERF*** REGISTRY
Action Taken
میل
PA
19.2.
economic
196
It is not an easy task to draw up a balance sheet and social advantages and disadvantages of the UK/HK relationship. Partly because the raw data is unavailable or censored, partly because neither HK nor UK are homogeneous classless entities like, say, my local pub's darts team. The sheer variety of sectional interests on both sides of the equation preclude simplistic valuations. The point of these brief notes is to untangle part of the puzzle as to where the interests and conflicts lay, so that, taken together with the comments of Dr. KC Chan on the HK/PRC relationship, we can clear the ground sufficiently to glimpse what will happen in the next few years. We have the authority of Mssrs. Bonavia/Wilson and no less than Jimmy MacGregor of the HK General Chamber of Commerce to the effect that a far-reaching decision about the future of HK will HAVE to be made by 1982- eighteen months away.
To begin with the political relationship. Constitutionally, every single matter to do with Hongkong is one of Crown perogative, that is to say, at the Prime Minister's disposal subject to whatever controls Parliament chooses to exercise. In practise, HK has large degree of internal autonomy i.e the HK Govt. can and does operate as a quasi-autonomous body in a variety of matters. This has come about, in effect, by the K Govt. exercking influence that on paper it does not possess on behalf of its own political constituency, viz. itself and a handful of mixed british(largely) and Chinese bankers, property moguls, manufacturers and so on. The Houses of Parliament have more or less failed to keep any sort of check on this process and it is now a commonplace to find Written Answers and even Oral Questions in the House answered in these terms: (e.g.)"Jack Ashley (Lab. Stoke-on-Trent) asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will consider the setting-up of a comprehensive social insurance scheme for the workers of Hongkong? Hon. Nicholas Ridley (Minister of State, FCO): This is a matter for the Hongkong Government." Hansard, Nov 5th 1980). The most direct expression of the impotence of Whitehall over the day-to-day running of the Colony is expressed in the words of Jim Callaghan( then Foreign Minister in Wilson's Govt.) on 6 Nov. 1974 when in response to a call for a wealth tax to be introduced in HK, he replied "I should have thought that there is a good case for increasing taxation in considerable measure in HK, but that is a matter for them. The fact that I am unable to issue a directive should not lead the Hon. Gentlemen to assume that there are not many aspects of the taxation system which could not be improved." (Hansard, 6 Nov74 Col 1068). (My emphasis).
Without going into the intricaties of how successive Hongkong Govts, have achieved this unconstitutional power, what one can say is that a judicious combination of colonial inertia plus financial muscle (roughly, the HK Govt's reserves once a major backer of sterling plus some leverage on major contracts) has been cleverly used against Whitehall in the last 20 years - 20 years in which a continuous decline in the will, ability and confidence of Whitehall to deal with colonial matters is evident to all. Britaiah Govts. be it Tory or Labour have a long-term policy of winding up the last tags of the old Empire: in this week alone Ridley was booed in the Falkland Ils. when he announced the probable solution (reversion to Argentina plus a 25 yr. lease- back), Belize is to become independent next year despite lack of agreement with Guatemala a policy that is bound to keep British troops there even after