SECRET AND PERSONAL
Y
initiative "with more definite proposals" and the need to avoid another rebuff. I think we need to be clear in our minds about the difference between suggestions for talks and more definite proposals. We made one carefully worked out proposal in 1979 and were rejected. We did so with little or no consultation with the Chinese; all we had had were our first and inevitably rather generalised talks with Deng and Huang Hua during the Governor's visit in March. The proposal failed broadly because it did not take sufficient account of Chinese political sensibilities. It is possible that if there had been more soundings in advance we might have avoided this set-back. But what I think we must avoid at all costs is another shot in the dark, another precise proposal which is not preceded by some soundings, allowing us to judge what Chinese requirements really
That is where the risk of rebuff occurs. I do not see such risk in suggesting talks with the Chinese on what is admitted to be a common problem and where they have already gone a long way to suggesting some such consultation themselves, eg in Gu Mu's talk earlier this year with Philip Haddon-Cave.
are.
8.
Such talks would I hope be informal and would at least initially not amount to negotiations in the full sense of the term. They would be soundings to determine the constraints on each side and the possibilities for some satisfactory compromise. They would allow us to reduce the risk of another proposal going wide of the mark. They might also give us an opportunity to influence Chinese thinking, since there is another risk that in the absence of such contacts the Chinese may come up with some unacceptable cut and dried proposal of their own. (Gu Mu in his talk in May spoke of the Chinese proposing a solution in due course.) The talks need not necessarily be held in Peking; there might be some advantage if they were carried out via the NCNA in Hong Kong. I have no strong views. But what we need is a sustained interchange, not the occasional message in high-level visits, which in the nature of things are often at risk (eg the Secretary of State's planned visit in October) and with deliberate silence in regular official contacts in between.
9. I do not under-estimate the difficulties of all this. Even if talks are arranged the Chinese may prove slow or obstructive or intransigent; they may insist on giving their own answer to the problem in their own time; but we are approaching a point when this will have to be tried, and it seems to me there is great advantage in doing it before we are under obvious financial and public pressure.
The more
unresponsive or exigent the Chinese prove, the more time we shall need to talk with them and to assess the implications.
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/10.