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Having put the matter to Peking once, they would not
need to be approached about subsequent requests for
long leases.
d) An alternative approach would be to issue periodic
leases which would roll forward on an annual basis
and have no termination bar except if required for
'public purposes'.
e) The leases issue was not immediately urgent. If there
were no signs of movement on the Chinese side we
could delay taking the initiative until the autumn
of 1981. Thereafter, we would have to initiate talks.
f) Whilst the Chinese might not make the same distinction
as we do between the long and short-term aspects of the
problem, we should avoid getting into a situation where
either side was taking up positions on a long-term
solution. We should build up towards the latter by
gradual steps through finding answers to the short-
term problems.
g) There would be a greater need for informal contact
with the Chinese over the future of Hong Kong in order
to 'improve their brief' on the subject.
h) Intermediaries might seek a role; they would need careful
guidance.
i) The Secretary of State would be bound to raise the
matter of confidence in Hong Kong with the Chinese
in view of earlier discussions but leases would not
be formally on the agenda and would be tackled under
the general heading of 'Hong Kong'.
SECRET
S4200(22454) DD.0332198 300M 7/79 GWB LTD.GP.870
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