CONFIDENTIAL
3
not interested in elections; the fact that fewer than 3% of those
eligible bothered to vote in the latest Urban Council election is
seen as strong evidence of this.
The Special Position of Hong Kong
8. The Governor's case is a strong one. Its most telling point
lies in the special circumstances of Hong Kong's relationship with
China and the risk of a Chinese reaction if Peking believed that a
major change in the administration of the territory was likely.
It is difficult to assess the degree of this danger in relation to
any particular move. The proponents of reform maintain that the
Chinese would not in fact object to an extension of the electoral
system, partly because Chinese officials who have been questioned
on the subject have returned bland and evasive answers. This
misunderstands the Chinese position. In practice much would
probably depend on the level at which changes were made; while
we need to err on the side of prudence in judging whether experiments
would provoke an unacceptable response, some steps could probably
be taken if it were clear that they were not going to start a
slide towards unacceptable change.
The Legislative Council
9. There it little doubt that any move towards even partial
elections to the Legislative Council would be too risky. It would
recall to the Chinese analogous developments in other dependent
territories, almost all of which have led to independence. It
would probably lead on to demands for corresponding changes in
the Executive Council, perhaps to calls for ministerial government
based on the majority. Even though the Chinese have so far
tolerated some moves of this sort in Macao it is unlikely that they
/could
CONFIDENTIAL