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but sees it as taking several years. In the meantime he
believes that the short-term issue cannot be postponed much
beyond 1982. He doubts whether the Chinese appreciate the need
for detailed action in the short-term.
4. It is possible to see how the present Chinese administration
may see the Hong Kong (and Macao) situation evolving. The elements
appear to be:
5.
a) no compromise on Chinese sovereignty;
b) a readiness to see the present economic system
(specifically 'capitalism') continuing in Hong Kong
for several decades, in the interests of Chinese
modernisation;:
c) a desire to iron out the imbalance between Hong Kong
and Southern Guangdong, through intensive development;
d) a concept, as yet hazy, that in the future the notion
of 'special zones' on the Chinese side of the border
can be applied to Hong Kong, with different types of
administration according to circumstances in areas
whịch are all, in Peking's view, part of China.
e) (more speculatively) a recognition that in practice
objective (b) can only be gained by tolerance of some
kind of British administration in Hong Kong.
So far the Chinese have confined their public exposition
of this thesis on the one hand to action on the ground (special
zones, increased investment in Hong Kong) and on the other to
general assurances. I would not agree with Sir M MacLehose,
however, that Peking do not understand the short-term problem.
They have, apart from the NCNA, economic experts in the Territory
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