}
Ꭰ
7
CONFIDENTIAL: STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
-7-
17. I suggest that the question should be discussed at the
Conference of Caribbean Governors in January 1981, to see whether
specific recommendations can be put to Ministers. If any steps on
these, or alternative, lines do make any headway, they should be
confined to the West Indian Territories and to the Falkland Islands,
because of the Hong Kong problem (see paragraph 7 above).
18.
Whatever the outcome, we must clearly ensure in future that
anyone recommended for appointment to a gubernatorial post in a
territory which retains capital punishment is left in no doubt
about the decision which he may be called on to make, and given
the opportunity to decline the job if his conscience requires this.
Political Consequences of a Decision in the British Virgin Islands
19.
•
Meanwhile, Mr Davidson may have to face a problem in the
British Virgin Islands next Spring if he decides to commute in the
face of local opposition. This could cause political difficulties
locally. On the other hand, the prospect of executions has caused
opposition in the United Kingdom in the past (Hong Kong 1973,
Bermuda 1977 and the British Virgin Island 1978). So if the Governor
found no grounds for commutation there might be pressure on Ministers
to intervene. Mr Davidson must be assured that his decision will be
supported whichever way it goes (see PS/PUS's minute of 20 October).
In 1978, the then Governor of the British Virgin Islands was obliged
to ask for assistance from HMG and a frigate was sent to the area
but was not required to intervene. Similar action might possibly
be necessary again in the British Virgin Islands. But if Mr Davidson
were to resign this would, of course, attract added attention to
the question.
CONFIDENTIAL : STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
/20.