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further warning.
He envisages that this would be done locally through the NCNA channel and that the approach would be on the lines set out in paragraph 2 of Hong Kong telegram No 285. Subject to one point of detail (on which I see no need for comment from here) Mr Cradock agrees with this form of approach, which takes into account comments we and he had made earlier. I recommend that we
authorise the Governor to issue a further warning on the lines now
proposed. While it is clear from the context that the Governor does not envisage that controls would actually be introduced until after his own and the Secretary of State's visits to Peking unless the situation gets a good deal worse I think this point is worth spelling out.
5. The Governor has raised the question whether the fighting on the Sino-Vietnamese border should affect the proposed approach.
Mr Cradock's view (Peking telegram No 238) is that the timing is not ideal, but he does not recommend against it. I have considered whether there might be advantage in delaying action for, say, 10 days. On the whole I think not, for the following reasons:
(a) There has already been some delay since the Governor
first put forward his proposal, occasioned by the need to wait for Mr Cradock's views;
6.
(b)
There is no certainty that the Sino-Vietnamese situation will have improved in 10 days' time. It may have got
worse;
(c) In any case there is no reason why the Chinese should
react adversely to a warning in the terms proposed (which does not take the form of an ultimatum. The NCNA in Hong Kong, to whom it would be delivered, can be in no doubt about the seriousness of the problem;
(d) It is therefore extremely unlikely that an approach
on a Hong Kong matter, made locally, would affect the climate for Mr Varley's visit.
I therefore recommend that a message should be passed to the Governor, if necessary by telephone, on the lines of the attached draft telegram.
23 February 1979
Copies to:
Mr Cortazzi
Mr Samuel FED
FED agree.
2
выборами
R JT McLaren
Hong Kong and General Department
CONFIDENTIAL