SEAD
CONFIDENTIAL
HKK2431
18193
PA
5+12 July.
3. KO INDEX
cc ̈ ̈PS/Mr Blaker
Mr Cortazzi
UND
(1834)
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IMPLICATIONS 1979/80
(814@
1.
I have now managed to speak to Mr/de Deney in the Home Office about the Treasury letter to him of 26′ October in which the Treasury said it would not expect the Home Office to have a faster intake of refugees than had been implied by the OD decision (OD(79)4th Mtg), eg 3,000 a year, or the full 10,000 to be phased over three years. Because of absence Mr de Deney had not seen the letter but was surprised by this and by the Treasury's further insistence that if the Home Office wished to take refugees in faster they would "no doubt take the matter back for collective Ministerial discussion".
2.
I said that the Treasury had raised a very serious issue which I thought both Mr Whitelaw and Lord Carrington had tried to avoid in the original Ministerial discussions. The plain fact now was that we needed to speed up the intake, at least temporarily. If this did not happen the Government would lose credibility in Hong Kong, with the UNHCR, with the opposition and with the voluntary agencies. It was for the Home Office to make the running, but there was a strong FCO interest and we should consult on the next steps.
3. Mr de Deney said that he would probably have to seek Mr Whitelaw's instructions. When it had become apparent that expenditure on the refugees in this country would well exceed present estimates, Mr Whitelaw had been reluctant to take up the matter at Ministerial level: so the correspondence with the Treasury had been at official level. Mr de Deney thought he would be equally reluctant, to reopen the question of rate of intake at Ministerial level now.
4. Mr de Deney thought that the Treasury letter had probably been issued under Ministerial instructions, which meant that any straightforward attempt to increase the rate of intake would be heavily challenged. His tentative thought was that we could still fudge the issue by arguing that we had liberty at least to accept 3,000 of the new quota in the period up to 31 March 1980. Given that we had only just finished accepting the quota of 1,500 agreed by the previous Administration, plus the 'Sibonga' refugees and a handful of other sea rescues, he saw no difficulty in planning for a higher rate than 500 a month at least for the next month or two. The October intake would in any case turn out to be about 1,200. Moreover it was always wise to over-budget because refugees were in any case arriving in this country at a slower rate than had been planned, for unavoidable administrative
reasons.
15.
CONFIDENTIAL