CONFIDENTIAL
}
Pol Pot's behaviour in the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights.
It was now being widely remarked that Pol Pot no longer controlled most Cambodian territory. There was still a popular misunderstanding
that recognition meant approval. It was also falsely alleged that
our failure to have relations with the Heng Samrin authorities had
led to delays in the delivery of famine relief and that people were dying because of diplomatic quibbles.
18.
Asked by Mr Murray about the American attitude to Fol Pot, Mr Holbrooke said that in their view neither Pol Pot or Heng Saarin represented Cambodia; they had told the Chinese so. They had voted for Pol Pot to be seated in the United Nations General Assembly
but had been very uneasy about this; Mr Vance had queried the need for the vote, but he had managed to convince him of the need for it. After discussion on the attitude of various countries to recognising Pol Pot, Mr Cortazzi noted that there was pressure in the House of
Commons for the United Kingdom to de-recognise Pol Pot and that there could be a debate on the question on 22 November. A statement was being drafted in such a way as to reduce the impact of our decision
to de-recognise; it would contain condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and would makeclear that there was no question
of our recognising Heng Samrin; our abhorrence of the Pol Pot regime
would be stressed but the crucial point would be made, that his govern-
ment failed to meet our criteria for recognition since it did not
control most of Cambodia.
19. Mr Holbrooke saw a need for the British Government to protect
its flanks against ASEAN and China, and to reassure Thailand. The timing of the announcement would be important. He suggested that the proposed statement should include a reference to the importance attached to the territorial integrity of Thailand and should make it clear that the Heng Samrin regime was installed as the result of the Vietnamese invasion and was not representative of the Cambodian people. Mr Cortazzi saw the utility of the suggestions and undertook to see whether the proposed statement could incorporate them. He added that there was a need to give prior warning of our intention to fellow members of the European Community, the old Commonwealth, ASEAN and the Japanese. The argument would be employed that the change in our position would bring us into line with the position already held by the United States, France and Germany.
SOUTH-EAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT
22 November 1979
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