(b) Second, the countries of the region where the refugees arrive need to respond, and be enabled to respond, in a manner that prevents appalling tragedy. Every humanitarian principle requires that refugees not be turned away and forced into situations that further endanger their lives.
(c) Third, the international community, in its widest sense, must unite in a truly co-operative and concerted endeavour so that actions and commitments, of an on-going character, do indeed give the refugees the chance for new lives and also provide the reassurance that the countries of South-East Asia need as long as the problem lasts.
38. It is essential that the first of these objectives be met so that the exodus does not continue in the present appalling manner. This is a responsibility of the Governments concerned.
39. Nothing, however, should obscure the immediate duty of the international community towards those who seek asylum. Their problems cannot wait.
40. The observations and suggestions that follow call for closely interlinked action. Without a recognition of this, there is danger that the efforts of the international community will remain insufficient.
(a) There is at the moment a "back-log" in South-East Asian camps of over 350,000 persons, who are awaiting durable solutions. As a first, but considerable step, it is necessary to reduce this "back-log", which must be achieved by a much higher monthly rate of departures from the camps than at present. This means exceeding the average rate of arrivals which, it is most earnestly to be hoped, will decline.
(b) In practical terms, the offers of resettlement made available over a 12-month span need now to be fully used within a maximum of six months.
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(c) Ideally, movement even at this rate should be directly to countries of resettlement. Such an effort would immediately ease the situation. this should not be fully possible, however, alternatives are essential. Clearly, the alternatives imply the identification and establishment of refugee processing centres or holding centres of a far greater capacity than presently made known. Governments in a position to offer sites for such centres, whether within or beyond the region, should advise UNHCR of the possibility.
(a) These urgent measures should be taken irrespective of the total number to be resettled. The problem requires sufficient on-going commitments, but swift action now to reduce the "back-log" is essential to bring the problem under control and will advance the achievement of an over-all solution.
(e) The total number of resettlement places available to UNHCR are inadequate even for the present case-load. They now need to be more than doubled from the 125,000 places available at the end of May 1979. The High Commissioner has already approached Governments individually, suggesting indicative numbers to them.