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such conference for ten years) opinion was divided on whether or not China should attack Vietnam. Some took the view that China should concentrate on her modernisation programme and later, in the fullness of time, turn her attention to Vietnam; others thought that by then it would be too late; Vietnam would be very strong militarily and politically and with a firm grip on Laos and Cambodia. I have no doubt these two views will be suitably reflected when the Chinese leader- ship discusses the subject. But, if I may trespass on Fercy Cradock's territory, I would doubt whether the subject is a pressing one with the Chinese yet, and it seems to me a waste of time to carry conjecture further on whether the Chinese will or will not attach (a subject which occupies hours of idle speculation on the part of my diplomatic colleagues).
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4. The fact that the Pol Pot forces were not very active during the rainy season would seem to indicate that they are in poor shape to withstand the Vietnamese offensive which is already underway. The size of the Vietnamese forces involved (some 180,000) indicates the determination to deal Pol Pot a knock-out blow. Although guerillas have an advantage if the forces attacking them have a concern for civilian casualties, this will not apply in Cambodia. The Vietnamese forces can be expected to show as much ruthlessness towards the Fol Pot forces and civilians caught up in the fighting as they did towards the Meo in Laos last year. I would, therefore, be surprised if by the end of the dry season the Fol Fot forces survive as more than a minor irritation to the Vietnamese; and I would not expect them to be in a position to claim to control any significant part of the country. Vietnam can then be expected to return to the subject of recognition with a view to overcoming the recent setback at the UN General Assembly.
5. I have been unable to discern any deviation from the well- known Vietnamese objectives in Cambodia. Any mention to Vietnamese officials of a "political solution" in Cambodia is met by the firm response that there is no political problem and ipso facto no need of a solution. The Vietnamese repeat endlessly in their official statements that the situation in Cambodia is "irreversible". They intend it to be so.
6. The international concern over the Cambodian famine has proved a tricky question for Vietnam to handle. She has attempted to create the impression that the famine is exaggerated by enemies of Vietnam and Kampuchea for their own ends, and that Vietnam is doing her best to cope with a food shortage which is blamed on the legacy of Pol Fot.
In fact, all Vietnam's actions over the famine since May of this year
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/have been