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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

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VIETNAM: SOME IMPRESSIONS ON RETURNING FROM MID-TOUR LEAVE

1. I thought it might be useful if I set down on paper as briefly as possible some impressions of the main subjects of interest here as they struck me after two months' leave.

Sino-Vietnamese Relations

2. I can discern no change at all in Vietnam's attitudes and policies towards China. I have, however, been surprised at the continuing supply of Soviet arms which appears to have gone on throughout the summer. When I was in Da Nang recently I saw some twenty MIG 21s on the airfield which had

I have also seen anti-aircraft guns being towed from Haiphong with packaging and grease still on them, doubtless from their journey from the Soviet Union. All this, of course, reflects the Vietnamese intention to arm themselves to a level which will deter a Chinese attack. The Russians, who must hope that they will never be called on to take military action in support of Vietnam, have an obvious interest in supplying the arms. I remember reporting in my despatch of 24 May that the Vietnamese forces were bigger and better equipped than ever before. This applies even more strongly to the situation today.

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3. Over the last few weeks Vietnam has repeatedly charged China with preparing to attack her.

we know there is no evidence of Chinese troop movements to support these accusations. Vietnam's charges would therefore appear to be designed partly to ensure continued motivation of the people (a real problem - see the section on the economy, below), and partly to distract the attention of others from her own military operations in Cambodia. As seen from here, the degree of success of these Cambodian operations will be an important factor in China's decision whether or not to teach Vietnam another lesson in the course of the next twelve months. The Chinese Chargé told me the other day that during a con- ference of Chinese Ambassadors in Peking in July (the first

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