6. We ourselves have throughout been conscious of potential weaknesses in the management structure of the voluntary refugee organisations concerned. There has been a number of examples of misunderstandings and failures in communication which have led to arrangements being handled less efficiently than they should. So far none of these weaknesses has led to a major breakdown. They are, however, bound to be magnified when the main programme begins in the autumn and they might then result in more serious mistakes being made and the possibility of adverse publicity as well as the prejudice that may result to the refugees themselves.
7.
There is also the longer-term need to secure comprehensive and speedy resettlement. This depends on offers of housing made by local authorities; if these do not come forward in sufficient numbers we shall have refugees kept in reception centres for excessively long and demoralising periods. I am writing to local authority associations to propose a meeting to discuss ways of co-ordinating arrangements for securing adequate offers. From enquiries I have received it is already apparent that local authorities need to know who to make the offer to, which criteria should govern their offer, and how the offer should be implemented. These enquiries underline the fact that there are many other matters about which local authorities will need to be in communication with those in charge of the reception centres at all stages of each individual exercise.
8. BCAR have brought together a co-ordinating committee of the voluntary organisations primarily involved. This has met twice and Michael Head attended as Home Office observer on the second occasion. The group is, however, no more at the moment than a talking shop and does not serve to ensure that co-ordination is improved on a day to day basis at the administrative level.
9. In addition to the formal representations for improving the co-ordinating machinery we have received I have undertaken various informal discussions with some of those primarily concerned. These suggest that a need is seen for two main elements: some sort of national co-ordinator and some strengthening of the administrative machinery. One possibility which would provide both these elements would be to set up a Board (for which provision is made in the government's contingency plans for refugees). There are precedents. There are, however, also objections. A Board would be likely to be administratively more expensive than other less formal solutions. It would mean transferring the main responsibility from the voluntary organisations to the Board. (If the precedents of Suez and Uganda were followed, the voluntary organisations would play a fairly substantial part in the membership of the Board itself but this would not counterbalance the inevitable shift in operational responsibility.) A Board would also create machinery which would very obviously facilitate the acceptance of substantial additional numbers of Vietnamese refugees. There is no doubt that when the 10,000 have all been admitted there will still be large numbers of existing refugees in South East Asia who have not been resettled and we shall come under pressure to take more. It is also possible that the main exodus from Vietnam will have revived, increasing the pressure on all countries to take larger numbers. Setting up
a Board could make it more difficult to resist that pressure. I think this consideration is almost certain to lead Ministers to oppose this solution unless it becomes apparent that there is absolutely no alternative.
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