Mr Murray
CC: Mr Cortazzi
FED
HK GD
1.
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CONFIDENTIAL
1376
PRE-GENEVA CONSULTATIONS:
JAPAN
Mr Kitajima called on me at his own request today and gave me the attached note of his Government's response
the consultative meetings reported in FCO Telno 142 to UKMIS Geneva.
2. I did my best to reassure him that there was no intention to "gang up" on ASEAN countries, explaining that the pre- Conference meetings were purely consultative. On his paragraph 2, I said that I fully understood Japan's wish to keep her final position open. On his paragraph 3, I said that the UK paper, at least, was conceived as a basis for consultation and, if it found favour, as a source of briefing for national representatives. It envisaged certain actions by the conference which could be proposed in national speeches, and no doubt picked up in the Chairman's summing up, and could, if appropriate, form the basis for parts of a declaration.' The paper might, indeed, if it were thought acceptable, be circulated as a a conference document, but these were all matters for decision in Geneva.
3. Mr Kitajima told me that paragraph 4 of his note meant that Japan will no longer be preparing the paper at 3(c) in FCO Telno 142 to UKMIS Geneva. The ostensible reason was the difficulty of producing a paper in the time, but Mr Kitajima did not
demur when I asked whether it might be that Japan feared it becoming known that she had written a paper on ways of putting pressure on the Vietnamese.
4.
+
*
Mr Kitajima's paragraph 5 was designed, he said, to reaffirm Japan's views that the conference should not centre unduly on "pledging" aspects. Nevertheless, he said, a separate indication from Tokyo suggested that Mr Sonoda's speech would not be critical of Vietnam and would probably apply only mild pressure for control of the exodus. There was no intention to go back on Japanese agreement (paragraph 5 of Telegram to Geneva) to make the opening national speech.
5.
I submit a draft telegram.
13 July 1979
RP Flower
South East Asian Department
BNFRINTAL