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informat n and views. The sort of issues on which a
common line would be valuable were:
3.
a). how should we ensure that Vietnam's
responsibility for causing the crisis is
adequately revealed without risking being
ruled out of order by Waldheim or encoura-
ging the hard-liners, e.g. the Chinese and
possibly the Singaporeans, to lay into
the Vietnamese so hard as to risk disrup-
ting the meeting?;
b). What do we see as our objectives for the
conference in terms of a final declara-
c).
tion, or resolutions, or other actions,
so as to establish that this is something
more than simply a pledging conference?;
How do we ensure that countries who fail
to attend, or offer very little at the
conference, are induced to help the-
international effort properly?
Murray said that this list was not exhaustive
and we would welcome a wide discussion.
On (c), he
had in mind particularly the South Americans who might
fear pressure on themselves. The US Embassy's first
comment on this was that the Americans could probably
lean on them.
4. On the Australian proposal for a meeting of
Ministers, we think it important for the mind-clearing
meeting of officials with limited participation to go
ahead first, We have invited the French because of
their Indo-China connections and their massive intake
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