CONFTEL VIAL
FUTURE POLICY
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8. There are serious political implications in the acceptan of a large-scale commitment towards Indo-Chinese refugees. Such a commitment would be seen as leading to an influx of immigrants which we could not control. There is also the risk that a willingness on our part to accept refugees could be exploited by racketeers. is difficult to reduce the extent of the commitment. I do not think we can go back on our predecessors' decision on the 1500 quota (paragraph 3). If we try to reverse the policy of giving guarantees to countries in South East Asia that we will in the last resort accept those rescued by U.K-registered ships it will be taken as being intended to discourage captains of British ships from rescuing those in danger of drowning. But we should so far as possible - and this will be difficult - monitor each case carefully to prevent corruption; we should not respond positively to any new approach by the UNHCR without the most careful consideration; and the criteria for the admission of other Indo-Chinese refugees on the grounds of United Kingdom ties or connections should be very stringent
indeed we shall have to consider what scope there is for tightening these criteria up.
9. I recognise the difficulties faced by the Hong Kong Government. But I do not think that we can agree automatically to accept refugees landed there from U.K-registered ships. We simply cannot tell what numbers this could involve. Nor would such refugees necessarily be more suitable for settlement in the United Kingdom than others in the camps. On the other hand, I recognise that a blank refusal to take any more from Hong Kong would be difficult to sustain. We need to consider carefully what additional numbers we could accept, having regard particularly to those who would present serious resettlement problems. We should also consider ways of offsetting the immigration commitment, for example, by changing the special quota of work permit for the dependent territories.
FINANCIAL TIPLICATIONS
10. If further groups of refugees are to be accepted, there would have to be some once-for-all expenditure on making ready the necessary accommodation, and the Government would have to meet the consequential expenses of the vauntary organisations. The former cannot be quantified at this stage. The best estimate available at present of the cost to the voluntary organisations of coping with the refugees from the Sibonga and the Roach Bank is about £0.4 £0.6M in the first year. This would be in addition to social security payments. Other Departments might also incur additional expenditure. The Home Office (and perhaps the other Departments concerned) is unable to meet all these additional costs from its existing public expenditure provision. In my view expenditure of this nature constitutes a legitimate clain on the contingency reserve. if refugees over and above these are to be accepted, the Government wold have to consider becoming even more directly involved in the reception and resettlement process (see Annex B).
Moreover,
CONFIDENTIAL