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CONFIDENTIAL

7. Mr Graham commented that the Department of Trade had now received copies of letters from some Singapore shipping lines to the British Masters on their vessels which told them to ignore any refugees in distress at sea. There was therefore evidence that ships from other countries were not facing up to the legal and moral obligations.

8.

The Secretary of State said that even if the Government had been prepared to maintain the previous Administration's undertakings, they would have been bound to attempt to find countries prepared to accept the refugees for settlement in the first instance. The majority of refugees were ethnic Chinese; they would naturally be better off if they could be settled in other countries in the region.

This process

of trying to persuade the authorities of countries to accept refugees for settlement would take time. In practical terms there was unlikely to be much difference for shipowners if the previous Government's commitments had been maintained.

9.

mitments

Mr Head pointed out that, in practice, a case had not yet arisen of HMG finally refusing settlement to refugees taken on board a British vessel. Those Departments responsible for settlement of refugees within the United Kingdom also had an interest in getting quick decisions from overseas governments so that they knew as soon as possible whether or not they had to receive the refugees in Britain.

10. Mr Swire said there had been some suggestions in the press that British companies would attempt to re-route their vessels around the area in which most of the refugee boats were to be found. While some companies may do this, he did not himself believe that this was an answer to the problem. There were only a limited number of British vessels on the route (possibly 7 or 8 at any one time) and there were legal and technical difficulties which prevented many companies from adopting this course.

11. Mr Shovelton confirmed that a number of UK companies were talking to their Masters about routing their vessels away from the affected areas. There were navigational difficulties and insurance and chartering interests had to be consulted. It would be impossible for all British vessels to avoid the area. He also pointed out that the typhoon season would affect the region over the next three months and some observers felt that the current wave of refugees would ebb during that period. He guessed that less than 5 per cent of the relevant vessels sailing in the China Seas would fly the British flag. majority would be from Japan, Hong Kong and flags of convenience countries.

The

12. The Secretary of State said that while it would be understandable if companies re-routed their vessels, he himself was not proposing this as a solution.

ROACHBANK

13. Lord Inverforth described the problems associated with the ROACHBANK. This vessel had picked up her refugees on 23 May and had arrived off Taiwan on 25 May. The Taiwanese authorities had refused to allow her to enter port. The Venezuelan charterers (CAVN) had already chartered another vessel to carry the ROACHBANK's cargo from

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