2.
CONFIDENTIAL
had proposed to the United Nations' Secretary-General that he should urgently summon a special conference on the issue. Meanwhile, if there was to be any hope of settling the refugees in the region, the Government had no option but to look at each case on its merits as the position arose. To maintain an open-ended commitment would negate any efforts to settle the refugees elsewhere.
3. Mr Swire said that while the industry understood the Government's difficulties it found the conclusions it had reached both unpalatable and unacceptable. In effect, the Government was placing upon the Masters and owners of British vessels the obligations and expenses of rescuing refugees while not being prepared itself to accept the consequences in terms of a commitment to accept responsibility for the refugees concerned. If the Government's position were maintained, British ships could find themselves held up in ports for very long periods of time while attempts were made to resettle the refugees in other countries. This was bound to create great uncertainty in the minds of potential charterers and would involve the industry in very great expense.
4. Lord Inverforth added that there was a very real risk that foreign governments would hesitate before chartering a British ship because they could not be sure that the vessel would not be held up in a Far East port while the question of settling refugees was resolved. He suggested that HMG should accept some financial responsibility for the costs of vessels which were delayed or pay for idle ships to be used as temporary dormitories in the Far East. This would allow the refugees to be sheltered while efforts were made to resettle them and would not detain the often expensive and modern vessels which now picked up the refugees.
5. The Secretary of State said that the Government recognised the great difficulties which faced the shipping industry but he did not hold out hopes for finaucial assistance. The industry had to recognise that the only way in which they could be given a complete guarantee that their vessels would not be held up in ports would be for the Government to offer an open-ended commitment to take all the refugees involved into the United Kingdom. This clearly raised other very difficult issues concerned with the Government's policies towards immigration. He asked whether it would not be the case that other countries' ships sailing in the region would face similar” difficulties and uncertainties, and would therefore be equally affected.
6. Mr Swire said that there was no direct evidence that a British shipping company had yet lost business as a result of fears that they would pick up refugees but it was perfectly possible that Masters of vessels owned by some foreign shipping lines would be prepared to turn a blind eye to refugees in distress in the China Seas. The industry did recognise the complexities of this issue but it urged the Government to reach quicker decisions on those cases which had already arisen. For example, the ROACHBANK had been moored off Taiwan for the last 13 days. While it was understood that diplomatic pressure was being exerted on the Taiwanese authorities to accept the refugees (and it was recognised that lack of diplomatic representation made this a difficult process), costs involved for the British shipping company of feeding the refugees and keeping the vessel idle were growing very rapidly.