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BOGABY 1178082
FN HIS GENEVA 9519237-JUN 72
TO IMMEDIATE FOO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 08 JUNE 1970
NFO HANOI, WASHINGTON, HONG KONG, JAKARTA, BANGKOK, MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE,
1016
MY TEL 183:
DE HAAN'S VISIT TO RANOT
:
1. I CALLED ON THE DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TODAY TO DISCUSS THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE UNHCR (TEXT IN MY TEL NO 184). MACICS AMD SNOXELL ACCOMPANIED ME.
1
2. ASKED BY DE HAAN WHAT THOUGHT OF THE MEMORANDUM I WAS DELIBERATELY CRITICAL. I SAID I WAS WORRIED LEST IT MIGHT MISLEAD WORLD OPINION. THE VIETNAMESE VERE CLEARLY TRYING TO GAIN CREDIT FOR CO-OPERATING WITH UNHOR IN TACKLING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM HUMANELY. BUT WE KNEW THAT IN THE MEANTIME THEY WERE CONTINUING TO DEHAVE IN AN OUTRAGEOUSLY INHUMANE FASHION. MOREOVER THE PROGRAMME COULD AT BEST COVER ONLY LIMITED NUMBERS, AND I PERSONALLY DOUBTED IF THE PROSPECT OF POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN IT WOULD HAVE MUCH OF A DETERRENT EFFECT ON PEOPLE TAKING TO BOATS IF PRESENT VIETNAMESE POLICIES CONTINUED. IT WOULD DE CHFORTUNATE IF THE IMPRESSION WERE TO BE CREATED THAT THE MEMORANDUM REPRESENTED A MAJOR STEP TOWAR SETTLING THE REFUGEE PRODLEN SINCE THIS COULD LEAD TO A SLACKENING OF EFFORTS DY
COVERNMENTS IN OTHER DIRECTIONS.
DE
2. DE HAAN REPLIED THAT MY ASSESSMENT WAS AN INTERESTING ONE BUT HE DID NOT SHARE IT. IF THE FAMILY RE-UNIFICATION PROGRAMME OAKED IT COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE SITUATION, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OTHER INITIATIVES WERE ALSO NEEDED. HE BOLIEVED WHAT THERE WERE OUTR'DE PRESSURES AT WORK (CHIKESE INCITEMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN VIETNAM AND INTERFERENCE BY OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITIES) WHICH IF LIFTED, COULD LESSED THE OUTFLOW. THERE WERE MANY REASONS FOR THE EXODUS. THE VIETNAMESE HAD TOLD PIR THAT IF THEY HAD NOT TAKEN CERTAIN ACTION IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS THE CUTFLOW WOULD HAVE BEEN DOUBLE
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18. DE HAAN FELT