CONFENTIAL
alleging that it is all a "non-problem" and that they cannot influence Vietnam anyway. In terms of a conference this may be
a better Soviet stance than one of active defence of Vietnam; so
our pressure, particularly on the Russians, will need to be applied carefully.
6.
My more immediate concern is for the British Embassy in Hanoi. The Vietnamese will soon know if they do not already that we are taking the lead in identifying their misdeeds and bringing pressure to bear; and they are bound to react. The content of UK/Vietnamese relations is negligible (despite the ATCP ships deal). Thus the Vietnamese could either reply by propaganda, c they could take action against our Embassy, or they could do both HM Ambassador in Hanoi, Mr Margetson, is probably in for a rough time. My own reading of the Vietnamese character is that ther
would not use violence, though I could be wrong, but I think quite possible that they will ask for Mr Margetson's withdra (the Vietnamese Ambassador here is away and Hanoi might be content to leave the present Chargé, Mr Giai, to hold the doom has a lot of left-wing contacts). I think we could live with ar absence of Ambassador on each side, but it would not be in cum
interest to have the Embassy closed on us because we need it as
valuable observation post while we are so involved with refugees Vietnamese and in the context of Sino/****** hostility On the Vietnamese
side, they might reckon that complete closure would lose them
their small Trade Office in Hong Kong.
Į
7. We are keeping the Embassy in Hanoi as fully posted as their scanty communications allow.
RECOMMENDATION
8. I recommend Ministers to confirm that our exposure of
Vietnamese behaviour over the boat people should continue
proposed, subject to the considerations in the preceding
paragraphs.
1 June 1979
CONFIDENTIAL
DF Murray
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