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5
11. (contd)
countries.
The scale of the problem from the North was, in any case, limited (even if virtually all would come to Hong Kong). The highest estimate I had seen was that 60,000 might still leave: more than ten times that number were likely to leave the South. Cuenod did not dispute this and made it clear that he did not expect de Haan's negotiations in Hanoi to result in any significant reduction in the outflow of boat refugees.
A Hong Kong R P C?
12.
Shepherd Lowman from the State Department suggested that Hong Kong (or Macau) might provide an RP C. I told him that I saw no mileage in either proposal and suggested that he should instead think of ways to persuade China to hold refugees in transit for the US.
Conclusions
13.
The Galang R P C will make no significant contribution to solving the overall problem. A small number of boats which might otherwise have headed for Hong Kong will probably be attracted to Indonesia, but only for a short period. Excluding organised vessels, only about 7% of the small boat outflow from South Vietnam between January and April has come to Hong Kong. There is therefore a huge potential for the rate of arrivals in Hong Kong to increase even if the outflow from both South and North remains at its current level. Hong Kong probably faces an overall arrival rate of at least 25,000 a month from June onwards.
Documents
14.
A.
B.
C.
D.
Attached to the file copy of this report are :
The Indonesian Government's outline of the Galang island R P C;
The Philippine Government's outline of the Tara island R P C;
Statements by delegations at the meeting; and
The full text of the Chairman's concluding
summary.
23 May 1979
CC
Distribution -/over
(I C Orr)
Assistant Political Adviser
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