(contd).
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4.
It will be best to leave ASEAN countries to determine, in consultation with UNHCR, the way in which refugees are to be assigned to the S P C. However, it is worth promoting concepts likely to help Hong Kong in the longer run, or if other S P Cs are set up, e.g. transfer of refugees who may not be found permanent homes overseas for a year or two. The high costs of maintenance in Hong Kong (at least US$2 per day) are a strong argument for the transfer of such refugees to cheaper S P Cs. 25,000 refugees in Hong Kong (the figure) would cost the UNHCR about US$18 million a year.
5.
There is some disagreement between A S E AN countries on the approach which should be taken towards the Vietnamese (who will be participating in the meeting). The Thais believe that public criticism might make Vietnam take steps to reduce the refugee burden on A SE AN countries; the Indonesians think a softer approach, emphasizing the value of orderly departure, more likely to succeed. It is in Hong Kong's interest that the ASEAN Countries, which have more political weight, should set the tone of any public discussion on Vietnam's role. In corridor discussions, however, we should emphasize the evidence of continuing Vietnamese encouragement of the departure of boat refugees.
Comparative Statistics
6.
At present Hong Kong has an arrival to departure ratio of refugees of 7 to 1, certainly the worst in the region, although refugee populations have also been rising , sharply in recent months in Indonesia (about 10,000 awaiting
resettlement now compared with 3,000 at the end of 1978) and Thailand (nearly 7,000 boat refugees compared with 4,000 at the end of 1978). At 10 May 1979 Hong Kong had 25,338 refugees from Vietnam compared with 4,998 awaiting resettlement at the end of 1978.
7.
Hong Kong has an area of 404 sq. miles and a population of 4.7 million. 25,000 refugees in Hong Kong are roughly equivalent to 62 per sq. mile or 0.53% of the population. The following table shows what similar figures could mean elsewhere:
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