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(h)
Ghazali was doubtful about whether there was much point in holding a Security Council discussion even if the proposed United Nations conference on 20/21 July was not particularly successful.
(i) Ghazali emphasised the strong Malay reaction to the inward
flood of refugees. Some opinion in Malaysia was even in favour of shooting them.
(j)
(k)
INDIA
4.
Ghazali thought that the Russians were only too pleased to see the difficulties which the refugee threat were causing but he did not think that the exodus was part of a Soviet master plan. We must be careful to avoid giving the green light for a further exodus by planning on the assumption that a million ethnic Chinese in the South would all leave.
Ghazali was very critical of the Indians. He thought that when the Secretary of State visited Delhi, the Indians were likely to urge him to maintain friendly relations with Vietnam in order to keep Vietnam out of Soviet clutches. The Secretary of State made it clear that there was no question of our accepting any such suggestion. Ghazali also thought, in the light of a recent visit they had had from Dinesh Singh, that the Indians would be
He noted trying to persuade us to recognise the Heng Sam Rin. that Dinesh Singh's visit had followed a visit to Delhi from Mme Binh from Hanoi.
t
The
Ghazali said that the Indians had two current obsessions. first was how to get their own back on the Chinese. The second was their disillusionment with the Americans.
THE UNITED STATES
5. Ghazali was critical of US policy in South East Asia. He thought that they had muffed their relations with Vietnam. He was disappointed by their failure to give adequate support to Thailand especially in the military field.
CHINA
6. The Secretary of State said that he did not think that we had played the "China card" properly. Ghazali said that the Chinese attack on Vietnam had been a lesson to the Chinese. There was some discussion of the likelihood that, if China were to attempt to punish Vietnam again, this would lead to an increased number of Soviet advisers in Vietnam and many additional Soviet weapons. The Secretary of State pointed out that the Chinese had at least called the Soviet bluff. Ghazali thought that the next Chinese move might be on the Ladian border in order to create a corridor down to Cambodia. This would,
In this of course, cause considerable difficulties for the Thais. context Ghazali was critical of Thai officials on the ground alleging that they had been unhelpful and had sold supplies to the Khmer Rouge.
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/THE SOVIET