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that an offer of interest until a settlement was made would only encourage the Banabans to procrastinate further.
10. Mr Blaker said that we had to get the necessary indemnities from the Banabans that they would take no further legal action, as well as settling the modalities of setting up a fund into which the money would be paid. He feared that this could not be done in as short a time as 30 days. He suggested that we should tell the Australian and New Zealand Governments as soon as negotiations were concluded, and then see whether they could not adjust their position on interest Meanwhile we would press on the Banabans the need for urgency, and make it clear to them that this would affect materially the attitudes of the BPC partner Governments. Lord Carrington added that, if we put the screws on the Banabans, they might be prepared to move; but he thought it right to warn Mr Peacock that we should mobably feel obliged to contribute our own share of interest up to The date of settlement.
PAKISTAN AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
11.
Mr Peacock said that Australia regarded this as a very serious problem, and that he had discussed it with a number of countries in Vienna as well as some non-aligned countries. He had regrettably found little agreement to put pressure on Pakistan. Lord Carrington said that India was the key to a political solution.
He had had a go
at Mr Desai when he stopped in Delhi on his way back from Tokyo, but had not succeeded in interesting him.
12.
The meeting ended at 5 o'clock when Lord Carrington and Mr Peacock went to the Ambassadors' waiting room to sign the bilateral nuclear safeguards agreement.
South Pacific Department
27 July 1979
Distribution:
PS PS/LPS
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff Mr Williams
PS/Mr Blaker Mr Cortazzi Mr Stratton
SPD
Rhodesia Dept
CCD
MAED
SEAD
SAD
ACDD
HKGD
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