23. HIG bargains for traffic rights with due regard to Hong Kong's interests, but as a matter of international law and the constitutional position, both the rights and respposibilities in this respect of Hong Kong traffic fall, as already pointed out above, upon MMC and not the Hong Kong colonial Government. It follows that certain of the negotiating procedures proposed in paras. 14-18 of the Hong Kong paper, which would unconstituionally circunscribe UK control of negotiations, could not be acceptable to HMG, and would not be workable, in practice, in daling with other countries.
24. Paragraph 5 of the Hong Kong paper alleges that there have been instances when the interests of CPA have been relegated to a second place, after those of the "major carrier". - This is by no means a policy or practice of HIG, which is guided, as described on the preceding paragraphs of this section of this paper, and Hong Kong should cite the instances it has ih mind, which are not readily apparent to HMG. The only negotiations cited in the paper are Malaysia/Singapore.
As explained
in detail hereafter, the UK had no alternative in this case but to accept these Agreements as finally concluded. Another British airline did not benefit at thei expense of: CPA and any sacrifice of that airline's interests would not have achieved any more satisfactory arrangements for CPA. Ministers! decisions, in that case werk reached after havina Hồng Kông views and adjourning the negotiations to consider UK Consultation with Hong Kong
25.
Insofar as the Hong Kong paper presses for consultation it is doing so at an open dooz: where the time for consultation or the passage of information is less than we should wish (it is because bilateral negotiations are with other states which suit their own convenience and tactics. The departments concerned in London are at one with Hong Kong in wanting to make consultation fully effective). But the proposals in the Hong Kong paper also include some which would go beyond consultation and give Hong Kong unprecedented and unconstitutional control of UK negotiations where Hong Kong interests are involved. It has, however, long been the practice al☎ is certainly intended to continue to be, to invite the Hong Kong Government and Hong Kong airline advisers to be with UK teams at negotiations, and to discuss the issues with them beforehand. The essential point in all this is that the Hong Kong official attends, not as a plenipotentiary of a third power, but as an adviser in the UK delegation. The proposals put forward would enable the Hong Kong official attending negotiations to, as it were, bargain with the UK delegation leader, impose his direct access upon UK Ambassadors and High Commissioners and in general allow him to act as though he is the representative of an indepdadent foreign state. This would be incompatible with Hong Kong's true constitutional circumstances and makes no recognition of the UK's international responsibilities. Nor is it reasonable to dictate to HM Ambassadors and High Commissioners abroad which British official♥·. should have access to them and with whom they should discuss confidential matters.
26. HMG entirely recognises, however, the desirability of consultations on Hong Kong interests. There is already much consulation, by all kinds of means, before and during negotiations. Board of Trade consultation with the Commonwealth Office has already been described and is aimed to make doubly sure that Hong Kong's interests are constantly under consideration. It is always open for Commonwealth Office to have a member on a UK'negotiating tem, if desired, over and above colonies' own advicers, in negotiations of confern to that Department (Para.24). It is also open to BOAC and CPA to discuss matters together (para.20) at any time, though it cannot be assumed that what the two airlines together want necessarily sets the course for FIG.
Other views, including those of the Hong Kong Government, have also to be
weighed.
27. As for para.23, of the Hong Kong paper, which suggests that CPA's views should be generally channelled through Hong Kong, this is what we understood happens. Presumably it is a matter between the Hong Kong Government, CPA and their commercial associates how far CPA communicate with tharLondon parent house. The proposal does seem to conflict with the paxx proposal for BOAC/CPA discussions though, and, in any case, CPA/Hong Kong would be the losers if they did not also malto use of CPA/Swires presence in London and access to developments here. (Swires is a London, not a Hong Kong company, and we take it that Hong Kong does not seek to tell cannot speak with a London company when this seons likely to be useful.)
25.
that it
UK contacts with Hong Kong itself proceed at all stages before and during negotiations. There may, on occasion, bo practical limitations. It is always liable to be the case that another Government may force negotiations upon us at short notice
5.