CONFIDENTIAL
patched up in Singapore with the Indonesian Director- General of Civil Aviation, who happened to be there while efforts were still being made in Kuala Lumpur to persuade the Malaysians to reverse their refusal. This proved, however, to be a Pyrrhic victory, provoking consultations between Malaysian and Indonesian Ministers which resulted in Indonesian
refusal to allow further flights until the Malaysians gave their approval.
11.
The strength of Malaysian feeling was demonstrated by Datuk Hussein's inability to accede to Mr Callaghan's plea for Concorde made on 8 December 1977, despite the very amicable personal relations which had been forged between him and the Prime Minister earlier in the year. The refusal was announced publicly as being principally on environmental grounds but it was common knowledge that the other reasons", also mentioned, were the Malaysian ratio decidendi. Nevertheless, environmental factors became generally more significant with Malaysian Ministers as they were bombarded with environmental literature on Concorde from all over the world, including the United Kingdom, and exposed to their own environmental lobby. The stance was not unpopular with a few of the more nationalistic Malaysians, who felt some pride that "brave little Malaysia" was standing up to their former colonial masters, but many others of all races were shocked and dismayed by the decision and its implications.
12. The British Government could have responded toughly to the Malaysian refusal on the grounds that they were in breach of the Chicago Convention and IASTA and that no other country had objected to Concorde
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