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5. Mr Morris explained SP's anxiety to pursue the cargo sharing' principle through the ECA rather than the Maritime Agreement, since this was economic cooperation and there could still be difficulties over the Maritime Agreement. Mr Murray saw no objec- equally tion to this line in principle, although there could be difficulti
in hanging 'cargo sharing' onto the ECA. Mr Priston added that there was nothing economically advantageous to the Chinese in the ECA they had concluded it principally for political reasons and if we wanted to extract further mileage from it, we might have to offer something in exchange.
The Maritime Agreement
6.
Mr Brown explained that the last round of talks originally GCBS stemming from/concerns had broken down on provisions implying the inclusion of Hong Kong vessels and seamen in the agreement. The GCBS wanted the Maritime Agreement because it would help to smooth implementation of the cargo sharing principle: conversely if there was no cargo to carry on a remunerative basis, there was little point in pursuing a Maritime Agreement.
Agreed Action
Telegram to the Governor of Hong Kong
7. The Governor is due to visit Peking at the end of the month. SP circulated a draft telegram which asked the Governor to assess during his visit the climate of Chinese opinion on Hong Kong. The FCO (MAED) agreed to consider the draft and Mr Murray felt the it might be possible to go further and ask the Governor for his or view of the problem and what, at the end of the day, Hong Kong saw as its last position. There was some discussion as to whether to pursue the FCO idea of requesting the Governor to initiate talks with the Chinese about the problem of Hong Kong in the Maritime Agreement context, if the Embassy had already made their mark with the Chinese on the follow up to the ECA. Mr Morris was concerned not to act precipitately or to lose the initiative to Hong Kong and it was decided to give the matter further consideration.
Telegram to the British Embassy Peking
8.
SP agreed to draft a telegram to be cleared with CRE and MAED. The telegram would (a) instruct the Embassy, if they saw no objecti on how to proceed immediately with the 'cargo sharing' understandi; through the door opened by the ECA, perhaps using as a lever the inward mission headed by the Industrial Adviser which was to visit China in May to advise on how Chinese exports might be increased; (b) instruct the Embassy to reopen the Maritime Agreement talks by recapitulating the position-while making it clear to the Chinese that we saw the exchange of letters as the vehicle for cargo-sharin The FCO suggested that the Hong Kong problem might be treated in t parts: vessels and seamen, to establish whether one or both were sticking points;
(c) request Embassy advice on whether the Governor of Hong Kong might sound the Chinese out on Hong Kong if the opportunity arose.