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only agreement would create for Hong Kong could be dealt with adequately by an exchange of letters incorporating the safeguards mentioned in paragraph 6 of the telegram. But the political problem fairly stated in paragraph 4 would remain. Its importance should not be exaggerated but it is not somthing we can ignore.
6.
The British interest in obtaining a maritime agreement is not at all clear, at any rate to me. British shipowners are naturally concerned to get some kind of understanding on cargo sharing and this
The DOT's case is being pursued separately, (paragraph 3 above).
for pressing ahead with the maritime agreement rests mainly on the alleged enthusiasm of the General Council of British Shipping (GCBS). That enthusiasm is of recent origin (at the time of Mr Dell's visit to Peking the GCBS were said according to the record of a meeting with the DOT on 1 August 1978 to have "little interest or enthusiasm for the treaty"). And I am not sure whether it is soundly based: at an FCO/DOT/GCBS meeting on 22 March the GCBS representatives mid that "if an exchange of letters on cargo sharing proved impossible,
other EEC we should still go for the maritime agreement: countries had it and we should not be left out".
7.
Against this background, I hope MAED will now ask the DOT
to provide a clear statement of the benefits which UK shipowners
are likely to derive from a maritime agreement, and the disadvantages
if no agreement is concluded. If the Chinese insist on a metropoliten agreement we will need to weigh the arguments very carefully;
and
if we then decide to go ahead we will have to convince Hong Kong that we have not put their interests at risk without very good reason. 8. In the meantime I hope the Embassy in Peking can be instructed to press hard for an agreement which includes Hong Kong. Chinese refuse to budge they should report back.
If the
R JT McLaren
Hong Kong and General Department
29 March 1979
Copies to:
Mr Murray
Mr Samuel, FED
Mr Morland, MAED
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