from: A J Uruge, head of weience Secretariat Division ↳
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0.cr. FEED (N. Brouther) FED (ru, fusland) HUGD (M, Williamson)
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B Watkins Esq
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, London SWIA 2118
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Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 3048 mars.
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Defence Department
(Switchboard) 01-218 9000
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1
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D/DS5/24/4/75
5 October 1979
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Dear Brian,
SHIP VISIT TO CHINA - TG 318.0
1. David Fall wrote to Chris Wright on 21 September about the question of TG 318.0 visiting China and the possible need to counterbalance such a visit by a separate one to the Soviet Union.
2. As you know the question of the visit of TG 318.0 to China has been put to the Chiefs of Staff. They have now agreed that it might take place subject to Ministerial agreement and the appropriate invita tion from the Chinese. They have also accepted the FCO view that ideally all or the bulk of the full Task Group should make the visit.
3.
but
We imagine that the eventual format of the visit will depend to a very large extent on the political situation nearer the time; for the present we are planning (subject, of course to Ministerial approval) on the lines mentioned in your letter to me of 31 August. It will, of course be an event of major political significance; so it behoves both Departments to ensure that our Ministers - and perhaps in due course the Prime Minister fully support the proposal and have given due consideration to its political and foreign policy implications, both as regard Anglo/Chinese relations and the likely reaction here in the UK. I know from our discuscious that you and FED have this very much in the forefront of your minds.
44.
As you yourself have suggested, the likely Soviet reaction is a factor which will have to be taken into account; and you are already giving consideration to the possibility of a visit by the Royal Navy to a Soviet port as a counterweight (antidote?) to the visit to China. We should be grateful for an early indication of your views on this because we need to consider the effect on the rest of the fleet programme of this deployment. In our view the most practical way of proceeding would be to send the Task Group or members of it to Vladivostok either before or after the Chinese visit. In planning terms this is by far the neatest option and avoids the difficulty which we would otherwise face of finding appropriate shipo to visit the Soviet Union. If, however, you thought this impracticable we should need to know quickly what other option you have in mind in terms of the number of ships you believe should participate, the level of representation, the timescale and the port(s) to be visited. The risk otherwise is that we could be left with the China enterprise
1
CONFIDENTTAT,
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