CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
C
perception of world events.. The Chinese made clear how
much they appreciated this and that as a result they felt
more at home in Britain than in the other countries visited.
This is a mixed blessing for us. Although our view of
Soviet ambitions is similar to the Chinese we cannot afford
to be drawn into subscribing to their brand of outspoken
hostility. The Prime Minister took care to put on public
record in her speech of welcome at No 10 that in our view
seeking areas of cooperation with the Warsaw Pact is as
important as restoring a military balance. Other European
hosts, where the Chinese were admittedly less outspoken,
also laid emphasis on their interest in detente.
11. In other respects too the talks were not particularly
helpful to us. The Chinese monopolised the platform (as
they did elsewhere in Western Europe) with rote statements
on their own international views, and on their economic
modernisation plans. There was little or no genuine
Their
discussion. They also remained unresponsive on the
international issues on which we sought their understanding
(Rhodesia, nuclear non-proliferation, and Korea), repeating
well worn and irrelevant ideological cliches.
tendency to broad-brush generalisation does not suit them
well for practical political exchanges. The only issues on
which their responses were at all satisfactory were the
bilateral ones of immigration into Hong Kong, where Premier
Hua gave a firm undertaking to act (although the proof of
this pudding is yet to be seen) and the conclusion of an
Air Services Agreement, on which they made a last minute
concession. Our claims against China were effectively
dismissed as either not the present Chinese Government's
/responsibili