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8.
c)
d)
e)
at the same time we should not look a gift horse in the mouth. In other words if the Chinese indicated that they saw no objection, whether in time for my October speech or not, we should proceed to clinch it with a public statement as soon as possible. In this case it would be up to the Hong Kong Government to counter the financial repercussions.
If by mid-September the Chinese have not commented, I should tell Wang Huang, First Director of NCNA, that I was disturbed by the continued level of inflation and did not feel able to proceed with the proposed statement this year for fear of aggravating the inflationary situation. This would get us off the hook, and might possibly provoke some disclosure of Chinese thinking.
After acting as in d) we should continue in a low key, to explain the advantages of the course proposed, which should be referred to as something which would be done as soon as the economic situation allowed. The longer this process continued without objection being raised, the stronger would be our grounds for going ahead. However, if it was felt necessary, the visit of
a senior Minister could be used to force a comment.
If there is an opportunity for you to discuss this with David Wilson without disturbing his leave I hope you will do so.
9.
I should add that I believe the long-term advantages of getting this question of the leases out of the way are of greater importance than any temporary economic set-back here. Consequently if it is your view and that of Peking that we should press on I would not wish to advance our economic conjuncture as an objection. But I think it should be taken into account if the balance in other respects is considered equal, and it does offer a reason for postponement which is plausible, if on other grounds a postponement is desired.
10. I am sending a copy of this letter to Peking.
11.
Since time is getting on perhaps this letter could be followed up by telegram.
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