However, Mr. Song's statement can only be considered as verification in On the basis of China's practical action, we may find that the key note has been si even carlier, One recalls that in 1949, when the People's Liberation Ariny headed som? for Guangdong (Kwangtung) and Guangxi (Kwangsi) provinces, people were worried ka the army might march right across Lowu bridge, for, on the eve of the liberation Guangzhou (Canton), no one could really predict the next move by Ching. But br leftists in Hong Kong organised themselves to visit the PLA soldiers in the wake of Shenzhen's (Shum Chun) liberation, they found that "changing the status quo of i Kong and Macau" was not on the card. Of course, this might only be a temporary policy and anxiety remained. But from then onwards, China has never shown hostiley or even unfriendliness towards Hong Kong and Macau. During the Korean War, Brindu was a member of the United Nations forces. Although it was only a reserve force, it could hardly avoid clashing directly with the Chinese Volunteers on the Korean battlefield. However, the crisis did not lead to substantial changes in Hong Kong's position. In 1956, riots broke out in Kowloon as a result of instigation given to pro-Taiwan groups. Leftists suffered heavy losses then. But the only thing, Beijing (Peking) did was to accuse the Hong Kong authorities of failing to stop the rightists in time and protect' residents. These facts are obvious enough. From Beijing's consistent policies, we can derive two fundamental principles: First, both Hong Kong and Macau are Chinese territory and the residents of the two areas are Chinese compatriots. Secondly, the problem of Hong Kong and Macau has to be solved one day, but China has no intention of doing so at present. These can be interpreted as policies set down by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) on the basis that they are in line with the present and long-term interests of China. Of course, throughout the 1950's, Beijing made no official statement on the issue, simply because it was felt a tacit understanding on this simple-looking but complicated problem would be far better than putting it down in words. But why did Beijing make the above-mentioned statement in the 1960's at length? This was because since the Soviet Union switched over to revisionism, Khruschev and his clique had often made use of the Hong Kong and Macau issue to attack China. They not only lashed out at China for tolerating British and Portuguese colonialism in Hong Kong and Macau, but also advocated independence of the two territories, causing opportunists to make a lot of noise about independence. Did Khruschev really care so much for Hong Kong and Macau? Certainly not. His aim was to provoke China and Britain and indirectly Europe and the Western powers. He was hoping to destroy the image of China among Asian, African and Latin American countries seeking national liberation. (At that time, the term "the third world" had not yet been coined.) On the other hand, any changes in the status quo of Hong Kong and Macau would undermine their importance to China and add to China's difficulties. Besides, there was one point which Khruschev dared not make explicit if both China and Britain fell into his trap, then it would become highly possible that the Soviet Union might succeed in edging its way into Hong Kong and Macau. Khruschev's plan to kill several birds with one stone was well thought-out.