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I
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to the problem of the leases in the hope that the Chinese will be prepared to deal with that question in isolation. But it is always possible that they will seek to widen the discussion, or seek concessions in return for acquiescence in the action we propose to take. The Governor and Mr Cradock have prepared a compendium of possible Chinese demands and the responses which might be made to them. It is not exhaustive: it is conceivable, for example,
that the Chinese might suggest that all land leases in Hong Kong (ie in the Island as well as in the New Territories) be converted into undetermined leases of the new variety, on the ground that the distinction which we draw between territory ceded in perpuity and territory leased under the 1898 Treaty has no validity. However, I do not believe that detailed briefing on possible Chinese counter demands is likely to be needed at this preliminary
stage.
We
11. One final point. It seems at least possible that the war on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier will not be over by the time the Governor visits Peking. It could be argued that in that event the Chinese leadership will be preoccupied by Vietnam and in no mood to discuss questions relating to the future of Hong Kong. should clearly keep the situation under review until the time of the Governor's departure. But as things stand at present I see no reason why the tentative soundings we have in mind should not go ahead as planned. If the Chinese show reluctance to discuss the leases problem, the Governor can be relied on not to pursue it. 12. I submit a self-explanatory draft Saving telegram to Hong Kong.
FED agree.
2 March 1979
Refrängmen
RJT McLaren
Hong Kong and General Department
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
FED
PUSD
Research Department
Mr Rushford, Legal Advisers
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