SECRET
4. IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE CHINESE THINK WE ARE TRYING TO PUSH THIS THROUGH FASTER THAN THE SITUATION MERITS, OR IF WE APPEAR OVER-ANXIOUS, THEY MAY BECOME SUSPICIOUS AND UNRESPONSIVE, OR
PUT A STIFF PRICE ON THEIR ACQUIESCENCE.
5. ONCE CHINESE ACQUIESCENCE IS OBTAINED WE WILL OF COURSE NEED
TO MOVE FAST. IT WILL STILL TAKE TIME TO PUT THROUGH THE
ORDER-IN-COUNCIL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IN HONG KONG I WILL HAVE
TO BRIEF AND OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND
SOME KEY MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. WHAT WE ARE
PROPOSING MAY FALL FAR SHORT OF WHAT MANY PEOPLE HERE WOULD HAVE:
LIKED. FOR SOME WEEKS, THEREFORE, SECRECY WILL HAVE TO BE
PRESERVED.
6. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I DO TRUST THAT BRIEFING FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, AND BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR THE PRESS IN ADVANCE OF HIS VISIT, WILL AVOID SUGGESTION THAT HONG KONG OR THE LEASES ARE MAJOR ITEMS IN HIS AGENDA AND FAR LESS THAT
AGREEMENT ON THE LEASES MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED AT THE TIME.
7. WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO PUSH THINGS ALONG, BUT WE MUST ON NO
ACCOUNT RISK A SETBACK THROUGH OVER-PREOCCUPATION WITH A QUICK -
COUP,
MACLEHOSE
FILES
HK & GD (6)
FED
LEGAL ADVISERS
FS
FS/LORD GORONWY-ROBERTS
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
[SENT ALSO BY BAG TO PEKING]
-2- SECRET