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wish to keep their options open. Hong Kong will therefore have to continue to live with uncertainty, though a satisfactory solution
of the problem of the New Territories leases would inject a
massive dose of confidence.
8.
An assessment of the concessions which the Chinese might seek
in return for a satisfactory solution of the New Territories leases problem lies outside the scope of this paper. But there are a number of matters which could be raised, or revived, during the course of the next ten years.
These include:
9.
(a) Sovereignty. The Chinese could seek a public
declaration by the British Government to the effect that Hong Kong is Chinese territory temporarily occupied by Britain;
(b) Specially favourable treatment and facilities for
Chinese-owned organisations. (There are some signs of this already eg Chinese organisations have sought, and in some cases have been granted, sites in Hong Kong at below market prices);
(c)
(d)
(e)
demand that Hong Kong should sever all links, including
economic links with the Soviet Union and its allies (Hong Kong provides limited port and repair facilities for Soviet ships, and there is some trade, particularly with Eastern European countries);
The appointment of an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. This question is dormant and there are indications that the Chinese are satisfied with the
present arrangement whereby the Director of the NCNA is regarded as the official Chinese representative for all practical purposes. But the issue has a very long history and Chinese demands could be revived; Pressure for Hong Kong to reduce its extensive economic and commercial relations with Taiwan. This is conceivable in certain circumstances (eg if the
Nationalists abandoned their claim to the Government of China and sought to establish an independent Taiwan).
The above list is illustrative, not exhaustive. Some of the
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